政府资助与企业创新：缓解匮缺还是滋长惰性？
崔兆财，张志新，李成
（山东理工大学 经济学院，山东 淄博255022）
摘要：政府研发资助政策究竟是缓解了企业创新中的资金“匮缺”程度？还是进一步滋长了企业的创新“惰性”行为？研究将2008—2017年间国泰安数据库中2480家上市公司作为考察对象，运用工具变量法2SLS和IV Probit两种方法对以上问题进行了实证检验。发现：（1）在控制时间、行业、企业性质和地区固定因素后，政府研发资助对企业创新活动产出以及创新意愿存在U型非线性激励效应，只有当政府资助规模超过某阈值后，才呈现出对企业创新意愿的“挤入”效应，不过这种“挤入”效应可能会带来“重数量”困境。（2）政府研发资助对企业创新偏好产生了显著的“倒U”型分层效应，过度补贴将引起创新偏好向低端化“降级”，造成“轻质量”困境。（3）以上结果在国有/非国有企业、高/低创新强度行业分组间均存在异质性。意味着政府的创新补贴政策需兼顾不同股权性质、不同行业创新强度的差异性，且需重点缓解民营企业和高创新强度企业的资本“匮缺”，以及“鞭策”国有企业的创新“惰性”，鼓励高创新强度行业内民营企业的创新积极性，否则会进一步加剧不同类型企业间的“激励扭曲”。
关键词：政府补贴；企业创新；创新惰性；U型关系；激励扭曲
主要研究结论：研究将国泰安上市公司研发数据库中2008—2017年间2480家上市公司作为考察对象，在考虑内生性的问题基础上，运用工具变量法2SLS和IV Probit两种方法实证检验了政府研发资助对企业创新惰性的多维影响。研究选取企业创新产出、创新意愿和创新偏好三个维度作为企业创新惰性的度量指标，并发现：（1）在控制时间、行业、股权性质、城市规模等固定效应以及企业自身特征变量后，政府研发资助对企业创新活动产出具有显著的U型关系。说明当政府资助金额低于某一特定阈值时，政府研发资助行为对企业创新产出具有抑制效应，而当超过这一特定阈值时，政府研发资助行为对企业创新产出具有促进效应。（2）政府研发资助对企业创新意愿存在U型非线性激励效应，只有当政府研发资助规模超过某一特定临界值之后，才能呈现出对企业创新意愿的“挤入”效应，反之，则会对企业创新意愿产生“挤出”效应。另外，政府研发资助对创新意愿的激励效应在国有/非国有企业、高/低创新强度行业间均存在异质性，非国有企业以及低创新强度行业内企业更易受到政府资助的激励效应。（3）政府研发资助对企业创新偏好产生了显著的“分层效应”，且这一影响呈现“倒U”型特征，即合理范围内的政府补贴能够激励企业选择“高端”创新，过度补贴则容易鼓励企业的寻租、优惠政策的攫取等“惰性”行为，引起创新偏好向低端化“降级”。分组结果显示政府研发资助更容易激励非国有企业以及高创新强度行业内企业选择高端创新偏好，且这种激励效应同样呈现“倒U”型特征。
Government subsidies and enterprise innovation: Do they alleviate the shortage of funds or foster inertia in enterprises?
Cui Zhaocai, Zhang Zhixin, Li Cheng
(School of Economics,Shandong University of Technology,Zibo255022,Shandong,China)
Abstract:In the development process of Chinese enterprises, there are many internal factors, such as the "modularization" trap, homogenization innovation, "surge" of industry and other independent innovation difficulties, and many external factors, such as imperfect intellectual property system and financial market system, all these factors together breed the enterprise innovation "inertia". Although the government′s direct financial support can alleviate the financial constraints faced by enterprises′ innovation investment, the hidden information problem in the allocation of government innovation subsidies makes the enterprises prone to rely on inertia, resulting in enterprises′ tendency to "cater" to government policies. They tend to "cater" to government policies through rent-seeking and preferential policy grabbing behaviors, resulting in the dilemma of "focusing on quantity rather than quality" in enterprise innovation. Therefore, utilizing government intervention to achieve the positive incentive effect on enterprises′ innovation willingness and high-end innovation preference is of great significance for enhancing enterprises′ innovation vitality and enabling local high-quality regional economic growth.
In this paper, we use the data from the CSMAR database and list 2480 companies from 2008 to 2017 as the research objects, finally we test the multi-dimensional impact of government innovation funding on enterprise innovation laziness by using the method of 2SLS and IV Probit. The results show that: (1) after controlling the fixed effects such as time, industry, city size, and enterprise′s characteristic variables, the government′s innovation funding has a U-shaped nonlinear incentive effect on the output of enterprise′s innovation activities and enterprise′s innovation intention. It means that when the scale of government′s innovation funding exceeds a certain critical value, can it show the "crowding in" of enterprise′s innovation intention effect, enterprises are willing to increase the proportion of R&D expenditure in revenue. Otherwise, it will lead to "crowding out" effect on innovation intention of enterprises, and enterprises will reduce the proportion of R&D expenditure in revenue. (2) The government innovation funding has a significant "Inverted U" effect on the innovation preference of enterprises, which means, while government subsidies within a reasonable range can encourage enterprises to choose "higher level" innovation, excessive subsidies can easily encourage enterprises to "Rent-seeking", grab preferential policies and other "inert" behaviors, resulting in the "degradation" of innovation preference to the lower-level. (3) The above results are heterogeneous between state-owned / non-state-owned enterprises and high/low innovation intensity industries.
The above results show that the government′s innovation subsidy policy should take into account the differences of different equity nature and innovation intensity among different industries. While the focus on alleviating the capital shortage of private enterprises and high innovation intensity enterprises, it should "spur" the innovation "inertia" of state-owned enterprises, and encourage the innovation enthusiasm of private enterprises in high innovation intensity industries at the same time, otherwise, it will further aggravate the "incentive distortion" among different type enterprises. Besides, local governments should pay more attention to stimulating the basic role of market fair competition mechanism in promoting the independent innovation ability of micro-enterprises. The intervention behavior should play the role of "icing on the cake" rather than "overstepping". Otherwise, it will aggravate the twisted allocation of enterprise innovation resources, promote the innovation inertia of enterprises, and is not conducive to the technological progress and development of the whole industry and economy high-quality transformation and development.
Key words:government subsidy; enterprise innovation; innovation inertia; U-shaped relationship; incentive distortion
引用本文：崔兆财,张志新,李成.政府资助与企业创新：缓解匮缺还是滋长惰性?[J].科研管理,2023,44(5):140-148.
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